e699027b4b
Every account created after the first must confirm a 24-hour link (Lib\Mailer::sendMail(), log-file or MailJet) before AdminAuth::attempt() allows login, folded into the same generic pass/fail as a disabled account or wrong password. First user and pre-migration rows are grandfathered; create-admin-user.php also auto-verifies for lockout recovery. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
84 lines
14 KiB
Twig
84 lines
14 KiB
Twig
{% extends 'admin/docs/_layout/layout.twig' %}
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{% import '_layout/icons.twig' as icons %}
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{% block title %}Admin authentication{% endblock %}
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{% block description %}Session-based login with admin/registered roles, groups, and user management, gating /admin/* and draft pages.{% endblock %}
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{% block robots %}noindex, nofollow{% endblock %}
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{% block docs_content %}
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<h1>Admin authentication</h1>
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<p>Every route under <code>/admin/*</code> — <code>/admin</code>, <code>/admin/clear-cache</code>, the docs section, and any admin page a project adds later — can be gated behind a session-based login against a <code>users</code> table in the <a class="icon-link" href="/admin/docs/database">{{ icons.book() }}database</a>'s <code>default</code> connection. It's off by default (same posture as the <a class="icon-link" href="/admin/docs/content-index">{{ icons.search() }}content index</a>, and for the same reason: it depends on SQLite, a real dependency plenty of sites won't want): with <code>admin_auth_enabled</code> left <code>false</code>, <code>/admin/*</code> is wide open, <code>/admin/login</code>, <code>/admin/logout</code>, and <code>/admin/users</code> all <code>404</code> as if they didn't exist, and nothing ever touches <code>Lib\Db</code> because of this feature — no <code>data/novaconium.sqlite</code> gets created just because the code exists.</p>
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<p>This replaced the original single-user HTTP Basic Auth stopgap (an <code>admin_username</code>/<code>admin_password_hash</code> config pair — both keys, and the <code>/admin/password-hash</code> hash-generator page, are gone). Same call sites in <code>bootstrap.php</code>, new mechanism: multiple accounts, real server-side login state (riding on <a class="icon-link" href="/admin/docs/session">{{ icons.book() }}<code>Lib\Session</code></a>), and user management in the browser.</p>
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<h2>Two roles: admin and registered</h2>
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<p>The <strong>first user ever created is the admin</strong>; every user created after that is <strong>registered</strong>. An admin runs the site: full <code>/admin/*</code> access, sees <a class="icon-link" href="/admin/docs/drafts">{{ icons.lock() }}draft pages</a>, and passes every <a class="icon-link" href="/admin/docs/access-control">{{ icons.lock() }}<code>Lib\Access</code></a> rule. A registered user can log in at the same <a href="/admin/login">/admin/login</a> and sees whatever content <code>Lib\Access</code> assigns to their account or their group — but <code>/admin/*</code> returns a plain <code>404</code> for them, not a login prompt (they <em>are</em> logged in; what they lack is the role). Each registered user can be assigned at most one <strong>group</strong> — a plain text label (e.g. <code>members</code>) that <code>Access::require('group:members')</code> matches exactly; there's no groups table to manage.</p>
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<h2>Enabling it</h2>
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<p>Turn it on in <code>App/config.php</code>:</p>
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<pre><code><?php
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// App/config.php
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return [
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'admin_auth_enabled' => true,
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];</code></pre>
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<p>Since this is the first SQLite-backed feature most sites turn on, make sure PHP has the <code>pdo_sqlite</code> extension enabled first (<code>php -m | grep -i sqlite</code>) — it's bundled with PHP but not always enabled; Debian/Ubuntu package it as <code>php-sqlite3</code>. Without it, the first request into <code>/admin/*</code> fails naming the missing extension. See <a href="/admin/docs">Overview</a>'s requirements list.</p>
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<p>Enabling the flag alone protects nothing yet — <strong>while zero users exist, the whole admin area stays open</strong>, precisely so the first user (the admin) can be created. Do that either in the browser at <a href="/admin/users">/admin/users</a> (you're logged in as the first user automatically the moment it's created, and the gate closes), or from the command line:</p>
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<pre><code>php novaconium/bin/create-admin-user.php admin admin@example.com</code></pre>
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<p>The CLI reads the password from stdin (echo suppressed at an interactive prompt, and pipeable from a deploy script), and always creates an <em>admin</em> — it exists for first-user setup and lockout recovery, both of which need one; registered users are created at <code>/admin/users</code>. Running it <em>before</em> flipping <code>admin_auth_enabled</code> on is the safer order — the open setup window then never exists at all.</p>
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<p>The <code>users</code> table ships as a framework migration (<code>novaconium/migrations/0002_create_users.sql</code>) and is created automatically the first time anything touches the <code>default</code> connection — no manual schema step. Passwords are stored as <code>password_hash()</code> hashes and checked with <code>password_verify()</code>; no plaintext, and nothing here ever selects the hash back out except to verify a login. Every account also has a <strong>unique email address</strong>, stored normalized (trimmed, lowercased, via <code>Lib\Validate::isEmail()</code>) — not used for login (that's the username), but every account after the first now must verify it before logging in (see below).</p>
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<h2>Email verification</h2>
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<p>Every user created after the first must click a link emailed to their address before they can log in at all — <code>AdminAuth::attempt()</code> fails a login the same generic way it fails a disabled account or a wrong password, with no distinction made to an anonymous caller between "wrong password", "disabled", and "unverified" (novaconium/migrations/0003_add_users_verification.sql's <code>verified_at</code> column). Two accounts are exempt by design, both following the same reasoning as the last-active-admin guard elsewhere on this page — verification can't depend on a mail transport actually being configured:</p>
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<ul>
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<li><strong>The very first user</strong> (created at <a href="/admin/users">/admin/users</a> or via the CLI below) is auto-verified at creation — there's no other admin to have vouched for them, and they're logged in immediately afterward regardless.</li>
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<li><strong>Every row that existed before this feature shipped</strong> is grandfathered — the migration backfills <code>verified_at</code> from <code>created_at</code>, so nobody who could already log in gets locked out retroactively.</li>
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</ul>
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<p>Every other new account gets a 24-hour verification link (<code>bin2hex(random_bytes(32))</code>, the same token pattern <code>Lib\Csrf::token()</code> uses) sent via <code>Lib\Mailer::sendMail()</code> to <code>/verify-email?token=...</code>. That route follows the same GET-confirms/POST-mutates shape as <a href="/admin/logout">/admin/logout</a>, and for the same two reasons: the content-index crawl hits every routable page as a forced GET, and email-security scanners prefetch links before a human clicks — either would burn a GET-mutates link's token. An invalid, already-used, or expired token never touches the database on either method — it just renders an "invalid or expired" page pointing back at <code>/admin/users</code>. Changing an account's email (the <code>email</code> action at <code>/admin/users</code>) resets verification and sends a fresh link to the <em>new</em> address, since an unconfirmed new address shouldn't inherit the old one's verified status — and because <code>AdminAuth::currentUser()</code> re-checks <code>verified_at</code> on every request (the same immediate re-check <code>is_disabled</code> already gets), a live session is locked out on its very next request too, not just future logins.</p>
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<p><code>Lib\Mailer::sendMail()</code> is separate from the pre-existing <code>Mailer::send()</code> the contact form uses (unchanged) — it's driver-dispatched via <code>mail_driver</code> in <code>App/config.php</code>: <code>'log'</code> (the default) appends to the same <code>novaconium/contact-log.txt</code> the contact form uses, so a fresh checkout can create and verify accounts with zero external dependency; <code>'mailjet'</code> sends through MailJet's Send API v3.1 using <code>mailjet_api_key</code>/<code>mailjet_api_secret</code> plus <code>mail_from_email</code>/<code>mail_from_name</code>. Adding a different provider later means adding a new case to that dispatch — callers of <code>sendMail()</code> never change.</p>
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<h2>Managing users</h2>
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<p><a href="/admin/users">/admin/users</a> lists every account and handles the rest: create a user (registered, with an email address and an optional group — only the very first is the admin), disable/enable one, assign or change a group, promote/demote between admin and registered, change an email address, change a password, and delete an account outright. Behaviors worth knowing:</p>
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<ul>
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<li><strong>Disabling is immediate.</strong> A disabled user can't log in, and any session they already had is re-checked against the table on its next request — there's no "still logged in until the session expires" window. The same immediate re-check applies to a role or group change.</li>
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<li><strong>The last active admin can't be disabled, demoted, or deleted.</strong> Any of the three would lock everyone out of <code>/admin/*</code> permanently (the zero-users setup window doesn't reopen — the table isn't empty), leaving only the CLI or hand-editing the database as recovery. The form refuses instead. Registered users carry no such guard.</li>
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<li><strong>Delete is a hard delete</strong> — the row is gone, the username and email become reusable, and any live session dies on its next request, same as disabling. Disable is the right tool for "shut this account out but keep it"; delete is for accounts that shouldn't exist at all.</li>
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<li><strong>More admins are allowed</strong> — "first user is the admin" is the default, not a cap; promote a registered user any time.</li>
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</ul>
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<h2>How it's wired</h2>
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<p><code>novaconium/src/AdminAuth.php</code> is a pair of reusable checks called once from <code>novaconium/bootstrap.php</code> for any resolved route whose path is <code>admin</code> or starts with <code>admin/</code>, and only for routes that actually resolved (no redirect on an unrelated 404): <code>AdminAuth::requireLogin($enabled)</code> redirects anyone not logged in to the login form, then <code>AdminAuth::isAdmin($enabled)</code> 404s anyone who <em>is</em> logged in but isn't an admin — a registered user is authenticated, so bouncing them back to the login form would be a lie. Because the checks live in <code>bootstrap.php</code> rather than on each page, <strong>a new admin page needs zero extra wiring</strong> to be protected — dropping a new directory under <code>App/pages/admin/</code> or <code>novaconium/pages/admin/</code> is automatically gated the moment it exists. The one exemption is <code>admin/login</code> itself, which has to stay reachable logged-out or the redirect to it would loop.</p>
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<p>The login form is a normal page with a normal form: CSRF-protected like every other form here (see <a class="icon-link" href="/admin/docs/forms">{{ icons.email() }}Forms</a>), reading the username via <code>Lib\Input</code> and the password straight from <code>$_POST</code> (the documented exact-value exception — cleaning would strip characters like <code><</code>/<code>></code> and fail a login whose password actually matches). A successful login regenerates the session id (<code>Session::regenerate()</code>) before storing the user id, so a session id planted or observed pre-login never becomes an authenticated one — then lands on <code>?return=</code> (how <code>Lib\Access</code> sends someone back to the gated page they wanted; validated to be a local path, never another site), or, with no return path, on <code>/admin</code> for admins and the homepage for registered users.</p>
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<p><a class="icon-link" href="/admin/docs/drafts">{{ icons.lock() }}Draft pages</a> reuse <code>isAdmin()</code> directly with a different failure response (a plain <code>404</code> for <em>everyone</em> unauthorized, never a login redirect), rather than duplicating the logic. The session cookie is scoped to the whole origin, so logging in once at <code>/admin/login</code> covers draft URLs and <code>Lib\Access</code>-gated pages too.</p>
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<p>Templates can read the <code>admin_auth_enabled</code> Twig global (it mirrors the config flag) — <code>admin/index.twig</code> uses it to show the "Admin users" and "Logout" links only when the feature is on. It's a display flag only; enforcement never depends on Twig.</p>
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<h2>Logging out</h2>
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<p><a href="/admin/logout">/admin/logout</a> is a real server-side logout now (its Basic Auth predecessor could only trick the browser into forgetting cached credentials with a fresh <code>401</code>): a POST — with a small GET confirm form, same shape as <code>/admin/clear-cache</code> — that drops the logged-in user id from the session, regenerates the session id, and redirects to the login form. It's deliberately not logout-on-GET: sidecars must stay side-effect-free on GET, both as ordinary HTTP hygiene and because the <a class="icon-link" href="/admin/docs/content-index">{{ icons.search() }}content index</a>'s crawl invokes every page's sidecar the way a real GET would — a logout-on-GET would end the crawling admin's own session the moment a lazy reindex rendered this page.</p>
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<h2>What this is (and isn't)</h2>
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<p>This is authentication plus a deliberately small authorization model: two roles and one group label per user, matched by <a class="icon-link" href="/admin/docs/access-control">{{ icons.lock() }}<code>Lib\Access</code></a> rules in sidecars — no permissions matrix, no role hierarchy, no per-admin capability flags. Registration is admin-driven only; there's no self-serve sign-up form. Sessions are PHP's native ones via <code>Lib\Session</code>, with the same cookie hardening it always applies (<code>httponly</code>, <code>SameSite=Lax</code>, <code>secure</code> on HTTPS). As with any password form, serve <code>/admin</code> over HTTPS in production.</p>
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{% endblock %}
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